Abstract
(random events with known probability dis-hedging may carry substantial risk when protributions) and (2) input prices and quan-duction is uncertain. Price and production tities are certain.
uncertainties are fundamental factors with respect to farmer involvement in risk management programs and are therefore funda-PRICE AND PRODUCTION mental premises for this study. UNCERTAINTY Price uncertainty is the result of market M M supply and demand fluctuations. Futures and THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT forward pricing markets have played an important role in the determination of prices Quadratic programming (QP) is a useful for many agricultural commodities and have tool to aid the researcher in examining agbeen shown to be instrumental in stabilizing ricultural risks. It allows identification of the price and income variability (Peck, p. 407) . optimal profit level considering risks and exAgricultural firms appear to behave quite dif-pected returns (Freund; Markowitz; Musser ferently when futures markets exist. The for-and Stamoulis; Hazell; Rae; Wiens) and has ward pricing markets under price uncertainty been widely used in agricultural risk research have been discussed by Danthine, Holthau-(Anderson et al.; Robison and Brake; Berck; sen, and Feder et al. who showed that when Lin et al.; Wiens; Musser and Stamoulis) . The futures markets exist, the degree of risk aver-model designed for the present analysis resion and price expectations do not affect the flects a representative farming firm and enfirm's output level, but do affect hedging compasses two steps. First, a Monte Carlo decisions because the firm produces output simulation model is used to indicate the diswhere marginal cost equals the forward price tribution of profit, [E(JI), V(n)]. Second, exunder certainty. Thus, most risk-averse firms pected utility maximization facilitates in the market make their production deci-determination of the conditions under which sions based on the forward price. As a result, farmers should participate in, or avoid, the planned production is seemingly unaffected FCIP. by the spot price or its variability.
In order to make decisions under uncerUncertainty in production is a second fac-tainty, many could argue that the need for a tor affecting farm income stability. It is caused utility concept is obvious. Utility theory is by many factors such as weather, disease, established to incorporate the random variinsect infestation, technological innovations, ables as well as the decisionmaker's attitude and public and private institutional policies, toward risk. The problems seem to be best These factors interact to create a uniquely handled by the von Neumann-Morgenstern difficult decisionmaking environment for ag-utility theory because it is closely related to ricultural producers (Mapp et al., p. 107) . probability theory (Batra, p. 3) . This utility Because agriculture involves biological theory provides utility functions which chargrowth over which there is no ultimate con-acterize the decisionmaker's attitude toward trol, production uncertainty may have a rel-risk. It is used in decision analysis to deteratively greater effect on income than price mine the choice to be made among distriuncertainty (Pope and Kramer (1979) , p. butions. 489).
Two special cases of the expected utility Pope and Kramer (1978) show that hedg-function, quadratic and exponential with a ing activities vary directly with risk aversion, normal distribution, have been widely used This suggests that a hedger would increase in empirical studies to explain farmer risk the hedge in response to increased price attitudes (Anderson et al.; Lin et al.; Freund; uncertainty. However, in the case of pro-Wiens; Musser and Stamoulis; Robinson and duction uncertainty, the results are ambig-Brake). Under these assumptions, two mouous. Chavas and Pope show the effects of ments (mean and variance) are considered production uncertainty on hedging decisions adequate for representing the decisionmakusing a specified multiplicative production er's behavior toward risk (Anderson et al., p. disturbance and a mean-variance utility func-92). However, severe limitations of the quadtion. Their approach considers agricultural ratic utility function, such as increasing abproduction's dependency on the distribution solute risk aversion and ignoring the higher of spot prices. The authors concluded that order moments of such a function, make its use impractical for this study. Some of these hedging, forward contracting, and selling at limitations are overcome by using nonpoly-harvest. Seller's call contracting and storage nomial functions like the negative exponen-are considered for cotton only. The study tial function which has a constant absolute considers several crop insurance purchasing risk aversion for describing attitudes toward plans: coverage levels of 50, 65, and 75 risk. Although analytic expected utility re-percent of the average county yield for a quires the assumption of normality, the ex-given crop. Each of these plans is coupled ponential utility function appears best suited with a trio of price election levels-low, mefor this analysis. The form of the exponential dium, and high-to be implemented in calutility functions used in this study is as fol-culating crop losses. In total, then, nine lows:
insurance options are considered for each of () u(fI) = 1 -exp(-al) the three crops evaluated. Federal crop insurance programs and risk where: management schemes are presumed to re-_U = ~utility .duce risk for farming firms. To achieve in-U = utility come stability, the assumption that farmers and =asaarsa-esocefcetare risk-averse is relevant. Assuming that net a = a scalar risk aversion coefficient.
incomes, l's, are normally distributed or that
Freund has shown that when profit (n) is the utility function is quadratic, farmers maxnormally distributed, the maximization of ex-imize expected utility. pected utility is equivalent to maximizing The forms of expected utility function for the following function: a firm participating in the crop insurance program and for the same firm that is not
participating in the program are as follows:
Thus, the maximization of expected utility (3) E(UP) = E(Dl) -(a/2)V(Dl) is also a quadratic programming problem when H is in activity analysis form (Freund, ad p. 256) .
(4) E(Unp) = E(lnp) -(a/2)V(-np) When the probability distributions are nonnormal, or when an agent's attitude toward where: risk changes the shape of the distribution of E =expectation returns, E-V analysis may become meaning-U= utilityfortheFCIP-participating firm, less (Newbery and Stiglitz, p. 88). Since negutility for the FCIP-nonparticipating ative output in agriculture has no meaning, ii f iii yields cannot be distributed normally. It can = net income for the FCIP participant, be argued that, even though output price (P) = net income for the FCIPnonparticrTp net income for the FCIP nonparticand yield (Y) are normally distributed, the ipant net return or income function (n) includes v(n) = variance of net income for the the term P-Y which may not be normal, ren-FCIP participant firm, and dering n non-normal (Bray, p. 594 ). Yet, v(n ) =variance of net income for the empirical research often finds a close rela-FCIP nonparticipant. tionship between mean-variance and more general risk efficient sets (Porter and Gaum-The linear net income function is converted nitz). Further, quadratic programming or lin-to activity form (equation (5)) in order to ear equivalents remain the most viable facilitate empirical study. portfolio building tool. Thus, a normal dis-(5) E( = S' tribution of net return is assumed for this study.
where:
S' = a (1 x m) row vector of expected
MODEL IN ACTIVITY FORM
"net return" per unit of individual activity, Various combinations of production, mar-X = a (m x 1) column vector of levels of keting, and insurance activities can be chosen activities, to represent the activities (X) in the model. m = number of activities, and This study is limited to three marketing stratq = 1 and 2 for participation and nonegies for selling wheat and grain sorghum: participation in FCIP, respectively.
The expected net return per activity, S, is Investment in a cotton crop increases durcalculated through simulation. Using the form ing both the growing and harvest seasons. of the parameters for net return distribution Insurance therefore provides three separate in a programming model, the maximization coverage periods with differing amounts of of the expected utility can be accomplished insurance coverage for each. FCIP designaby maximizing:
tion of these periods are as follows.
(6) E(Up) = S'X -(a/2)X'QX (1) If the crop is damaged or destroyed and acreage is released from the timê^~~~~~~~~~a nd ~it is too late to plant cotton until the (7) E(Unp) = S'X-(a/2)X'QX first blooms are shed, it is considered to be in the first stage and the guarsubject to:
antee will be 50 percent of the yield (8) TX < b, guarantee level of FCIP. for all L = 1, 2, 3, Thus, vector X includes marketing activities and (X's), FCIP participation activities (X') and for all K = 1, 2, 3, production activities (X). Equations (6) and where
,,,,\ I where:
(7) are maximized subject to chance constraints (equation (9)) and will be explained L = elected price option, later. K = elected yield guarantee option, In this study, fixed costs are ignored in the QP analysis since they are given in the short PR 1 = proportion of an acre destroyed run and will not affect choice under constant in first stage, risk aversion. Harvest and preharvest costs PR = proportion of an acre destroyed are separated because harvest costs are asin second stage sumed to be stochastic, varying with yield, while preharvest costs are fixed. The insur-PR 3 = proportion of an acre destroyed ance premium per acre of land depends on in third stage, price election, production guarantee level, FCIYD= federal crop insurance yield, region, individual farm, and crop produced. Thus, the indemnity formula for cotton differs INDEM= per acre indemnity for ith crop from that for wheat and grain sorghum.
losses, YGLK = yield guarantee level for K op-As indicated by equations (11) and (13) (12) PR, + PR + PR 3 = 1participation. R R2 3 R . The amount of FCIP indemnity paid to Calculating indemnities for wheat and grain cotton producers depends upon which stage sorghum requires a different formula:
of production prevails when the damage oc-(13) INDEMK = [(YGL -FCIYD) -M * curs. It is therefore necessary to estimate the PEL probability of failure in each stage. As noted earlier, one of the components of the QP for all L = 1, 2, 3, model is expected net return per unit of and activity. For calculating expected net return for all K = 1, 2, 3.
per unit of each crop insured under FCIP, If wheat and grain sorghum are not harvested, the indemnity receivable in the event of a the producer does not incur harvest costs and crop failure is needed. Thus, from selected the production guarantee will be reduced, FCIP participation data, Table 1 , two asfor wheat, by the lesser of three bushels or sumptions are made: (1) FCIP participation 20 percent for any acreage that is not har-from 1965 to 1972 is representative of the vested. This reduction for grain sorghum will typical dryland farm in Knox County and (2) be the lesser of 5 bushels or 20 percent for there exists equal probability of cotton crop any acreage that is not harvested. failure in both stages 1 and 2 (PR 1 = PR 2 ). In order for the crops under scrutiny to be The first assumption is made because of eligible for indemnity, certain conditions the lack of "acreage released unharvested" must be met. For wheat and grain sorghum, data in stages 1 and 2 prior to 1965 and after actual yield must be less than the quantity 1973. belongs to stage 1 or 2, so the average prob-abilities of such . Hence, the ability of failure for both stages was obtained constraints Prob (1 -y) from the data for this period. In the event are equivalent to the nonstochastic conof crop failure, and assuming equal failure straints: probabilities in the first two production stages, (19) MXS, E(N)'Xp -TN(XP' ENXP) 1/2 the probability of failure in stage three (PR 3 ) is equal to [1 -(PR, + PR 2 )]. Thus, the But the optimal allocation of land among probabilities of failure in case of crop damage crops should be derived using quadratic proin stages 1, 2, and 3 are 10.7 percent, 10.7 gramming. The inclusion of the variance-covpercent, and 78.6 percent, respectively.
ariance matrix (EN) as a constraint in a QP percent, model requires manual allocation of land to CHANCE CONSTRAINTS different crops and thus defeats the optimal use of land by QP, since the purpose of using It is necessary at this point to explain the the QP model is to obtain the optimal alconstraints (equation (9)) which allow total location of resources. The variance-covarisales to be limited to less than total produc-ance matrix (EN) is therefore not used in tion. Suppose that a representative farm max-these constraints. Instead, only the variance imizes equation (6) subject to the following (oZN) for i crop is implemented. Consechance constraints:
quently, constraints (equation (19)) are substituted by the following constraints: The where: probability statement indicates that the quanf n Xpi = acres of land allocated to crop i, tity of crop sold (MX 8 ), must be less than or equal to the quantity of crops produced with Xi = units of ith crop sold, and at least (1--y) probabilities. In the termiNi = yields obtained from ith crop per nology of stochastic programming, the probyields obtained from ith crop per acre. ability vector ( l-y)
is referred to as a confidence levels, while its counterpart vec-Probabilities of 90 percent, (1--), were setor (y) is called "risk levels." It is assumed lected for the chance constraints to assure that the representative farm, confronted by that total crop sales through marketing aca risky environment, chooses risk levels ac-tivities would not exceed total production. ceptable to its management. The smaller the Consequently, the values for TNi from the values in vector (y), the smaller the pro-Table of Percentage Points of t-Distributions pensity for risk-taking of the representative will be 1.282. It is important to indicate the farm. From the theory of chance-constrained possible relationship between confidence programming (Vajda, p. 78; Paris, p. 270) , levels, (1-y), in constraints (equation (16)) it can be shown that: and the risk aversion coefficient "a" in equa-1NX < 0, tions (6) and (7). y is a vector of probabil- (17) The choice of "a" in this study adheres to those NXp which are not smaller than the method used by Sharpe. This approach E(N)'Xp -TN (Xp/NXp)1/2, and the prob-derives E-V frontiers as the change of basis solutions when "a" is parameterized. Various of mean and variance of net returns an easy degrees of farmer risk aversion are considered task. The simulation model used herein is given both FCIP participation and nonpar-especially advantageous in that it enables ticipation. Comparisons of E-V frontiers may exploration of the consequences of stochastic help in deciding whether or not to be in-dependence resulting from the interdependvolved in the program. ence of several variables (i.e., yield and prices It will be assumed that a farmer insures on hedging, forward pricing and seller's call the total acreage rather than only a particular contracting, storage activities, and cash sales). piece(s) of land. It is further assumed that Thus, simulation seems to indirectly handle the general model of expected utility max-the correlation among the variables through imization is sufficient for obtaining an ade-hierarchical structures of dependency. In this quate description of farmer behavior study, net returns for (n) years have been (Anderson et al., . simulated, Figure 1 . A sample size of 170 observations was chosen after the authors determined that tested increases in the sam-ESTIMATED COMPONENTS OF THE pie size (n=185; n=200) effected no sig-QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING MODEL nificant changes in net return while incurring greater computer costs.
Empirical implementation of the QP model
It is important to note that all prices and requires estimating the net return vector (S) costs have been discounted to the same peand variance-covariance matrix of net return riod in order to ensure consistency in mon-(Q) for each activity, as well as relevant etary value. September, 1979 was targeted as resource constraints (b) and related input-the discount period since that was the earliest output coefficients (T). In this section, the planting season (for wheat) for the crops empirical estimation of S and Q for the QP under consideration. Discounting facilitates model is clarified. A total of 76 activities for production and marketing decisions by procotton, wheat, and grain sorghum are in-viding a present value of net return basis. cluded in the empirical model. Of these, only three are FCIP activities. Production activities comprise another three while the re-CALCULATION OF PROBABILITY mainder consists of various marketing options.
DISTRIBUTION OF PRICES AND YIELDS (S) represents the net return calculated for each activity.
Simulation is used extensively in specifyTo obtain the distribution of net returns ing the model for a representative farm in per unit (S) for each activity in the model, Knox County, Texas and for using the model a simulation model is used. The Monte Carlo to evaluate various risk-reducing strategies. approach estimates the net return vector(s) Such simulation necessitates generating crop and a variance-covariance matrix of net re-yields and prices characteristic of Knox turns (Q) for 76 activities. The expected County's dryland conditions. Yields and outvalue and variance of net returns for each put prices are considered to be the only activity were estimated for a representative sources of net return variability in this study. farm, assuming both participation and non-Therefore, yield and output price are treated participation in FCIP. A set of time series as random variables, and input prices are data of net returns for all activities under-assumed to be known. taken by the representative farm is conAs was indicated earlier, crop yields are structed for the Monte Carlo simulation. Based prone to unpredictable or random variation on actual historical relationships (1965-due to numerous factors. It follows, then, 1979), these data are instrumental in build-that control over any one of these factors ing the mean vector and variance-covariance results in a lesser degree of yield variation. matrix of net returns. Use of simulation is The prevailing assumption here is that future prompted by the fact that yield and price variability of a particular crop is closely redistributions are multiplied and truncated to lated to past variability. The time trend obtain the distribution of net returns (See method can be implemented when yields are where: (y) is yield, (a+bT) is the mean yield Equation (24) is an identity. In order to in year T, (e) represents the residuals, and find the conditional distribution of the spot a and b are parameters.
price given the cash and futures prices at Hedging decisions are based upon price planting, AFP and ABasis are assumed to have expectations and available information, linear relationships with the cash and futures namely current and past spot prices, and prices at the time of planting. Thus, futures prices. These price data may offer the best estimate of harvest price because they (25) FP = a + a 2 FP,t+ a 3 CP + el are the only information available for pre-and dicting harvest price at planting time. Finding the conditional distribution of cash prices at (26) ABasis = bl + b 2 FPi + b 3 CP, + harvest, given futures prices and the cash e 2 . price at planting is necessary. Rockwell and If equations (25) and (26) are substituted Telser's conclusion that futures prices are into identity equation (24), it can be conunbiased estimates of subsequent spot prices cluded that the distribution of spot prices will be adopted. The following notation de-depends on both the cash and futures prices fines the basis, or the difference between the at planting, or: cash and futures prices, for two periods, hedging and harvesting:
(27) D(CPt+l) = f(CPt+i/FPt,t+, CPt).
(22) Basis, = FPt+i -CPt Using identity equation (24) at tm ( both the basis and futures prices, respecFPt+,,t+i = Futures price at time (t+i), cont mt ri attime (t+), tively. These residuals are therefore utilized 'tt m y at te in variance-covariance matrices to randomly FPtt+i = Futures price at time t, contract generate changes in bases and futures prices maturity at time (t+i), ith time because the spot and futures prices at harvest in the future, are unknown. Thus, the harvest price distri-'bution will be conditional upon the futures Basist+i = Basis at time (t+i), i.e., at har-and cash prices observed at planting. The vest time, and variance-covariance matrix of the yield equaBasis, = Basis at time t, i.e., at planting or tion residuals, the futures price change rehedging time. siduals, and the basis change residuals are Because of location or grade differences, the used to randomly generate yields, changes in basis at time (t +i) may not be zero.
prices, and changes in the basis by the simThe spot price can be obtained by sub-ulations. Equations (21), (25), and (26) are tracting equations (22) and (23): used to obtain the variance-covariance matrix. Seemingly Unrelated Regression is used (24) CPt+, = AFP + ABasis + CP t to obtain the variance-covariance matrix and where:
asymtotic efficient estimates of parameters involved in these equations. ABasis = a column vector of changes in the basis for the three crops and RESULTS AFP = a column vector of changes in the RESULTS futures prices between two periods Linear programming (LP) results reflect the of time for the three crops.
behavior of a risk-neutral farm in selecting The AFP and ABasis are assumed to be nor-different marketing strategies for selling its mally distributed, crops. These results show that the expected net returns for FCIP participants are higher election levels increase, the quantity hedged than those for nonparticipants. The higher increases. Alternatively, decreasing RAC levthe production and price election protection els reduce land allocation to grain sorghum levels, the higher the expected net returns production, thereby reducing the quantity of for a farm involved in FCIP. As anticipated, grain sorghum hedged. the LP solutions indicate that total acreage The QP results show that expected net is allocated only to cotton, the highest risk returns are affected by participation in the crop analyzed.
Federal Crop Insurance Program. Participants Quadratic Programming (QP) results show receive a higher expected net return than that the risk aversion coefficient (RAC) is an nonparticipants for all risk aversion coeffiimportant factor in determining marketing cient levels. Expected net returns to a nonand production strategies. These strategies participant farmer vary between $5,646 and vary markedly as the RAC changes. The ex-$22,566. By contrast, a participant receives treme RAC values relate to either variance between $7,031 and $24,612 for low prominimizing or expected profit maximizing tection levels (50 percent), and $10,124 to behavior. The lowest RAC value (a = $36,417 for high ones (75 percent). These .000020) is associated with an expected profit results appear to indicate that FCIP is benmaximum while the highest RAC (a = eficial to farmers. However, the level of risk .001250) represents the minimum variance entailed in higher expected returns may be for a given portfolio, questioned. As expected, the variance under Allocation of land among different crops FCIP participation decreases steadily as the varies depending upon the FCIP participation guarantee level increases. status of a given farm. Less land is allocated A comparison of expected returns, varito wheat production under FCIP participa-ances of returns and expected utilities for tion. Thus, wheat sales made via hedging do dual and triple crop production reveals sevnot change. More land is allocated to cotton eral benefits of diversification. A substantial production under FCIP participation, causing increase in variance for the same level of a definite impact on the implementation of expected return is observed under dual crop seller's call contracting. The percentage of production as compared to triple crop prototal cotton sales made via seller's call con-duction for various levels of RAC's. Also, tracting remains constant, however, regard-expected utilities for a dual crop production less of the producer's FCIP participation program possess a wider variation range than status. Grain sorghum production appears to that of the triple crop production process. increase given FCIP participation, boosting Thus, diversification reduces risk and exthe quantity sold via hedging as a conse-pected utility variation for different RAC levquence. As both the protection and price els. Exponential utilities have been calculated parison of the coefficients of variation (CV) for both FCIP participation and nonpartici-of net returns for FCIP participants versus pation for a representative farm in Knox nonparticipants can be found in tables 2-4 County. The inverse relation between ex-(COFV1, COFV2, COFV10). These coeffipected utility and risk aversion is suggested cients represent a specific risk level for a by utility theory. The relationship is shown given net return mean and standard deviation. in Table 2 ; that is, the expected utility The CV value for FCIP nonparticipants ranges (EXPU1) for nonparticipation varies from from 389 percent to 158 percent, COFV1, about -295,694 to 9,823 for the various RAC Table 2 . As a farmer's risk aversion coefficient values. The lower the level of absolute risk (RAC; column A) decreases, the CV value aversion, the higher the expected utility.
decreases. Expected utility for FCIP participant farms Table 3 represents the minimal production displays a lower range for the different par-guarantee, 50 percent, for FCIP participants. ticipation options as opposed to nonparticFor RAC's between .00125 to .000020, paripation, Table 3 . Negative expected utilities ticipant CV values are less than those for are found for high to moderate levels of risk nonparticipants, indicating a lower risk level. aversion, but positive values prevail for very Nonparticipant farmers bear more risk as the low risk levels. The specific expected utility RAC decreases. (EXPU2) range for 50 percent guaranteed What is the effect when the production production starts at -261,648 and goes up to guarantee level is increased? Table 4 , Option 12,056. Thus, expected utility varies much 9 represents a production guarantee level of more widely under FCIP noninvolvement than 75 percent. Again, participant CV values are for involvement. Participation brings about lower than those for nonparticipants. This a lower expected utility for high and mod-pattern held for all nine FCIP options. Thus, erate levels of risk aversion, while nearly risk-it was concluded that FCIP participation does neutral and neutral farmers experience high reduce risk under production protection levlevels of expected utility under FCIP partic-els of 50 percent or greater. ipation. These levels increase as production and price election protection levels increase, Table 4 . CONCLUSIONS The Federal Crop Insurance Program is the CONCLUSIONS point of controversy as some economists deThis study has investigated five of the most bate whether it has successfully fulfilled its widely used risk management tools available original purpose of reducing production risk to agricultural producers in order to discover for farmers. Results of this study bolster the the most effective strategy for minimizing the argument that FCIP is indeed an effective variability of net farm income. With assumpmeans of production risk reduction. A com-tions of random production and output prices coupled with certainty of input prices and The chance constraints implemented in this quantities, a normative programming model study created some limitations for the model. for a simulated dryland farm in Knox County, These constraints resulted in the percentage Texas was developed and tested. The results of sales of total production through various indicate that active involvement in FCIP, par-marketing strategies at different levels of risk ticularly at high production guarantee and aversion coefficients being held constant. This price election levels, motivates futures mar-limitation arises because the risk levels (y) ket participation for the QP selected crop(s). were held constant for various levels of risk Futures markets offer farmers a viable tool aversion coefficients (a). But y may vary at for minimizing price uncertainty. Wheat and different levels of (a). As explained earlier, grain sorghum sales transacted via hedging, (a) and may not be directly or explicitly and cotton sales made through seller's call related; however, changing y and/or (a) shift contracting guarantee the producer a set price the E-V frontiers. One solution to this probfor the crop despite market fluctuations.
lem may be to parameterize y at various levels The variation of expected utility is reduced of (a) However, the problem needs further under crop diversification and a higher ex-research in order to explain the relationship pected net return for a given level of risk is of T and (a). achieved. Thus, FCIP participation coupled
In the final analysis, the education enwith involvement in futures markets and a deavor to inform farmers about FCIP and diversified crop production plan comprise futures market mechanics should not only be the optimal risk management strategy for dry-continued, but should receive more emphaland farmers in Texas. sis. Farmers should be made aware that negligence of the opportunity to take advantage
The risk aversion coefficients (RAC) play ligene of the opportunity to take advantage Tha significat re n c oefficients (RAC) play of these effective tools is the most risky proa significant role in determining optimal mar-duction and marketing strategy of all Howketing and production strategies. An individ-ever caution must be taken to find those ual farmer's risk aversion coefficient, or participation levels which are most beneficial attitude toward risk, greatly influences the to the individual producer. Farmers should farm's expected net return. The smaller the be encouraged to see the whole portfolio RAC levels, the greater the farm's expected management picture. These educational efnet returns for FCIP participants. Nonpartic-forts should stress to farmers the equal imipants have a lower expected return for all portance of production and marketing RAC levels. Thus, FCIP appears to be a ben-diversification, and the effectiveness of FCIP eficial strategy for a representative farm in and futures markets in accomplishing these Knox County, Texas.
endeavors.
